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ECONOMICS OF THE NEW MEMBER STATES:
A POST-CRISIS PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
2008–2009 witnessed a largely unexpected derailment in the catching-up process
of the new member-states (NMS) of the European Union. Convergence to EU-15 lev-
els has come to a halt already by 2008 with the slowdown of economic activity, and
has been positively reverted in 2009. The contraction of GDP in most NMS exceed-
ed that of the Euro Zone by 2.1 per cent, with Hungary registering a drop of 6.3 per
cent and the previous envy of the rest, the Baltic States registering double digit
drops, unprecedented in peace time development [more on that in: WIIW 2010].
Since recovery in 2010 is modest and also in 2011 likely to be mediocre, at least an
election cycle– but perhaps more – is wasted in terms of real convergence, conven-
tionally postulated in theories of economic integration. Also this development
stands in stark contrast with the generally upbeat mood, strongly represented in the
literature [Kolodko 2009] seeing a fast and continuous catching up as a baseline sce-
nario, provided rather innocent, commonsensical maxims of economic policy mak-
ing – such as avoidance of excessive deficits and disregard for externalities – are
being observed.  
These developments took by surprise most observers of the regions as well as
central banks, fiscal authorities and international institutions. The vulnerability of
the NMS to external disturbances was though a subject of some theorizing, howev-
er the intensity and imminent occurrence of the spillover of global financial crisis
has called for some reflection, both among policy-makers and academics. In short,
while some envision a return to normalcy, and that relatively soon, others [Myant
and Drahokoupil, eds 2010] interpret the financial crisis as the final verdict on tran-
sition, one that has finally uncovered the long lasting unilateral dependence and
unilateral, asymmetric integration of Central and Eastern Europe in the global hege-
monic system of capitalism.
This essay addresses four major issues confronting the Central and Eastern
European new members of the European Union in the decade to come. First:
what to think of the financial meltdown of 2008-2009. Second, what have they
learned from the tremors, having shaken the previous star performers of the
EU? Third we ask if we can expect a return to ‘normalcy' as forecast by most
models of financial rating agencies and international financial institutions?
Fourth the question is raised what did the new members benefit from their EU
membership? Some conclusions on the future of EU reforms and policies close
the overview. 
ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
A., With the passage of time we learn more data about the size and scope of the melt-
down. First, while the crisis indeed wiped out entire industries, such as most invest-
ment banking, it has not wiped out the entire financial sector. Moreover the more
we learn about the balance sheets of banks around the globe, the more we might be
surprised to see, that many of the big financial institutions are in pretty good shape.
Profits are slightly below the levels of the previous year, but all in all business seems
to have been as usual. And while the press was preoccupied with cases of major pub-
lic bailouts, several other institutions were in no need of public money, and far not
only Barclays with its conspicuous overseas takeovers. Major banks in a number of
EU states, including those in Spain, Poland and Hungary did not require public
action, contrary to their Irish or German counterparts. In short, while some finan-
cial institutions collapsed, others flourished. We can by no means talk about the cri-
sis of the entire financial sector of the globe, not even of that in all advanced
economies. Interestingly, major collapses occurred not in the relatively unregulated
areas like hedge funds, but in the fields where the visible hand and yes, the so fre-
quently required regulator was more than marginally present, such as in mortgage
lending. The subprime crisis was therefore clearly one of state failure, rather than
market failure [Dimsky 2010]. The role of over the counter deals, structured prod-
ucts and financial innovation with its related lack of transparency was clearly over-
rated in the popular reaction.
Likewise more detailed analyses of the causes and the mechanisms of the crisis
[Reinhart and Rogoff 2009] were able to demonstrate the fundamental differences
to those of the Great Depression, not least owing to differences in the workings of
global capital markets and owing to the presence of major automatic stabilizers, pri-
marily public transfers and coordinated action by the public authorities in the glob-
al scale, avoiding thus the beggar thy neighbor policies of the interwar period. The
much criticized disciplines of the WTO as well as the mechanisms of the EU single
market, most importantly competition policies and the joint fiscal framework,
helped avoid a relapse into old fashioned protectionism. Likewise the survival of the
institutional and policy framework allowed to start working on what is euphemisti-
cally called as an exit strategy, implying the discontinuation of pumping indiscrimi-
nate amounts of money into the economy, and reverting the mostly improvised pro-
liferation of interventions into the workings of the market. 
In short, a return from exceptional, ‘war-time’ management practices of the
panic phase of 2008-2009 a certain ‘return to normalcy’ is already in the making.
Governments declared their schedules to return to the numerical limits of the
Stability and Growth Pact, and ECB calls to revive solid operations, typical of ‘peace
times’ are being heeded. The wrestling over Greece in early 2010 is a clear indica-
tion that in most of Europe the inclination to take wartime as normalcy, and peace-
time as exceptional is no longer given. 
B., What should we think about the real economy in terms of usual activity indica-
tors that characterize macroeconomic performance of EU nations? First and fore-
most, it is important to recall, that global output in 2009 contracted by a mere 1.2
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per cent, Euro Zone output by 2.1 per cent, EU output by 4.3 per cent, while sever-
al economies managed to grow, like China, India but also Poland. This is exactly the
opposite pattern to the ones observed during the Great Depression, when core
economies contracted much more than those in the periphery.1 According to the
consensus view of analysts, from the OECD to the IMF and the EU Commission, the
global and the European economies are to grow in 2010 and 2011, even if recovery
is fragile and thus its robustness may well be less than mechanistic modeling would
have it. Thus, at the bottom line, we registered a single year of contraction, which is
though unpleasant, but not without parallels. 
In terms of inflation the good news is that it has not been extinct. While many
analysts feared of a deflation, the overall contraction of price levels has not materi-
alized in the sense of ECB, implying four- rather than just two- quarters of consecu-
tive decreases in the overall price levels. On the contrary, in some cases - as Hungary
and the Baltics - inflation already flared up, and in other cases, as in Britain and
Ireland, Spain and Greece, the question whether governmental spending translates
into inflation is a matter of ‘when’, rather than of ‘if’.
In terms of unemployment the situation is equally sobering, but by no means
extreme or catastrophic. The unemployment rate of the EU has climbed close to the
double digit levels by early 2010, which is certainly bad news.2 But this overall num-
ber is hardly above the customary rate of the 1990s. True, this had been, already then
a major social and economic challenge for the Union. Still, 9.9 per cent for the Euro
Zone and 9.5 for the entire EU at the end of 2009 is not a severe overshooting over
9.8 per cent of the 1996-2000 average, or 8.6 per cent for the 2001-2005 average,
even if in certain countries and regions, especially in Spain, reaching 20 per cent by
spring 2010 and Latvia, exceeding the 25 per cent level, which is devastating. By
contrast, and defying the bad track record of the 1995-2005 period, unemployment
has not soared in traditionally weak Slovak and Polish labor markets. Their respec-
tive 12.9 and 11.9 per cent,3 but remain way below the 18 to 18.5 per cent that fea-
tured the preceding period. This observation should not be read in terms of compla-
cency, as governments must surely act, but the macroeconomic impact must be put
in proper numerical perspective. Even in the Czech Republic, the 2009 figure of 9.2
per cent is surprising by traditional standards, rather than extremely high in EU
standards. 
C., What has been summarized above translates in economic theory as a clear case
of a cyclical slump as contrasted to a structural crisis, a difference the world has
known to appreciate in the 1973 and 1979 global downturn. If the recession is cycli-
cal, it usually does not call for structural measures, let alone rethinking the econom-
ic theories and the fundamentals of the market system, as several commentators,
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Book, February, 2010. 
3 Central Statistical Office of Poland webpage, accessed on 15 March, 2010.
and not just in the press, have called for. Rather what we observe is a return to nor-
malcy, a point to be elaborated below.
First and foremost, what we observe is a corrective phase, when previous over-
valuation of assets, especially on the stock markets, were cut back to size, i.e.
brought in line with the realistic ability of those assets to generate revenues in the
medium run. Certainly, following two decades of what Alan Greenspan termed
already in 1996 as ‘irrational exuberance’ it takes a longer period of trial and error
until the new terms of exchange emerge, thus there is nothing surprising in the rel-
atively slow and tumbling recovery of financial markets. 
Second, as previously privately hold toxic assets have been transferred to public
hands, authorities will have a tough time in figuring out what to do with those. In
other words, the crisis of private banking has been transformed into a severe dise-
quilibrium in public finances, with no clear cut strategy to overcome the new chal-
lenge. What is clear however is that private markets are unwilling to finance any lev-
els of debt, and a relapse into inflationary finance in the open manners of the 1970s
is no longer an option. Under this angle it is a welcome development that the EU
institutions in general and the ECB in particular continues to act in defense of solid
finances and do not make allowances coming from the political sphere to ‘bridge’
fiscal disequilibria at any cost and through any means, irrespective of costs and con-
sequences.4
Third, as it can be elaborated at greater length, the improvised set of state inter-
ventions created a situation where unintended side effects dominate the intended
ones, therefore the exit strategy can by no means be found in the direction of fur-
ther state intervention and the revival of Keynesian recipes, that were elaborated
under different conditions, especially different conditions pertaining to the trans-
mission mechanisms of money markets [Leijonhufvoud 2009; Csaba 2009]. From
this it follows that the way out will be in the discontinuation of conditions of an eco-
nomic martial law and a return to established peace time practices, with significant
improvement in terms of regulation.  
NEW MEMBER STATES IN THE MELTDOWN 
A., The new member states could gather a series of experiences during the 2008 -
2010 period. First, as can be shown prior to the out brake of the crisis, simplistic pol-
icy options aiming at shortcut solutions - and aiming at saving the pains of slow ad
complex institution building - enhanced the external vulnerability of the star per-
formers, primarily the Baltics and Bulgaria, to an unprecedented degree [Csaba
2008]. This vulnerability translated into immediate external shocks when quick
adoption of the single currency proved impossible, and when the currency mis-
match, between earnings in local currency and debts accumulated in foreign cur-
rency, primarily of households and the corporate sector, exploded as a side effect of
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4 Top Notenbanker droht merkel mit Verfassungsklage. Handelsblatt, 24 March, 2010, online edition,
downloaded on the same day.
the global financial panic that ensued from the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008. 
But the fragility of economic development has become manifest in all other
states. Czech GDP declined by 4.2 per cent and unemployment rose to 9.2 per cent.
The previous growth champion of central Europe, Slovakia also experienced a steep
decline in her GDP, reaching a drop of over 5 per cent against the impressive growth
of 6.2 per cent in 2008 and 10.2 per cent in 2007.5 While Poland managed to grow
by nearly 2 per cent in 2009 (after the upward revisions of the last quarter),
Hungary experienced a drop of 6.3 per cent, and the currency crisis could only be
averted by resorting to a jumbo IMF-EU-World Bank loan, a unique arrangement of
its kind orchestrated in October 2008. The experience of the Visegrad countries less
Poland reflect that doing nothing over years is not an innocent lapse that would run
without costs in the short and medium runs. 
The deepest decline hit the previous star performers, the Baltic States, where the
decline of GDP was double digit, and unemployment rates soared accordingly. The
crux of the problem here was lack of institutions and lack of will, on the side of the
authorities, to cool down the economy when unsustainable current account deficits
surfaced already in the middle of the decade. While the currency board regime does
exclude devaluation and limits severely the possibilities of setting interest rates at
will, however it does not mean a lack of any policy instrument. For instance bank-
ing supervision is at the hand of authorities and borrowing, especially in foreign
currency, can be limited e.g. by imposing a compulsory deposit requirement or tax-
ing the profits accruing from this form of lending. Likewise tax policy has been
around and so are many other policies, provided higher tax revenues are spent on a
variety of items with public goods character, such as improving the physical and
institutional infrastructure, protecting the environment or building up stabilization
funds along the Norwegian or Russian lines. But authorities have refrained from act-
ing, as the naive belief in growth as a panacea for any social ills, along the ‘bigger the
better’ lines, was universal. Also the steep fall of output and living standards, that fol-
lowed Soviet disintegration propelled expectations.
B., What has been described above is a set of policy mistakes, that revolve around
the notion of populism. This implies a propensity of decision-makers to follow the
immediate preferences of their electorate, irrespective of their longer term ramifi-
cations. Procrastinating with long overdue reforms in the central Europeans (save
Slovakia), or staying idle when faced for longish years of overheating is certainly not
attributable to broader systemic factors, to institutional structure or long term his-
torical path dependence. On the contrary: these are prime examples of policy omis-
sions/mistakes, which recall in elder observers the Latin American experience with
recurring currency crises, i.e. the inability to learn the lessons of the past. While
these may, and indeed do, have deeper social, historic and other roots, the mistakes
themselves should not be identified with the former. For this reason it seems prema-
ture to consider the crisis as ‘the final verdict on transition’, as the insightful collec-
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tion by Myant and Drahokoupil [eds, 2010] does. For the structural and institution-
al weaknesses they list, including the insufficient upgrading of export patterns and
the one-sided integration of the transition economies to the global financial mar-
kets, together do not explain the specifics of the crisis. Neither its timing, nor its
mechanism, let alone the differences in scope by the country.
Should we accept the view that asset bubbles are by and large inevitable byprod-
ucts of the workings of free markets, as we have observed over the past two cen-
turies or so, it were difficult to see the Spanish or Irish burst of the real estate bub-
ble as systemic rather than cyclical crises. Likewise it would be hard to draw such
broad, theory-shaping conclusions as the above cited authors do, joining the choir
of many voices deploring the allegedly incurable ills of market capitalism. Be what
those ills might be, it is certainly a non sequitur to infer them from a cyclical down-
turn whose length is neither unprecedented nor its depth is unparalleled in postwar
economic history.
C., What NMS experienced in the 2008-2010 years was, in terms of European poli-
cies, the limits to solidarity. If one compares the unprecedented – and of course
more than justified – efforts of the EU to forestall the collapse of the Greek domi-
no/not least in fear of its spillover to Spain, Italy and Ireland/ in the spring of 2010,
to the hesitant and regularly belated reaction to the deep crises in the Baltics,
Hungary, Romania and their neighbors, Ukraine and Serbia, all turning to the IMF
for rescue, the picture becomes sobering. Moreover, while public authorities,
including the Commission, did finally act to assist the countries listed, private
agents, especially headquarters of financial institutions were not slow in using their
affiliations in NMS as milking cows for covering the losses suffered by themselves
from adventuresome investments, primarily in overseas markets. 
It is important to put the events in perspective. For one, it is beyond doubt that
registered capital flows have not followed calls from President Sarkozy and other
leaders for patriotic economic policies and relocate their activities in the home
countries. On the other hand, the credit crunch in the region was exacerbated by
the freeze on lending decisions, not justified by local market conditions. This was
certainly not an outcome of ‘concerted action’ orchestrated by some dark forces.
But the consequence of having outsourced the centers of decision making abroad,
following the microeconomic considerations and neglecting macro repercussions
has also become manifest for the policymakers in and outside the NMS.
AFTER THE CRISIS – BACK TO NORMALCY?
A., Seeing the end of the crisis phenomena, the recovery of output and financial
market indicators, it is indeed tempting to offer the convenient assumption: after
rainy days sunny ones must be coming. However, reality might be more complex.
Recovery in the global economy might turn more fragile and less evenly distributed
as most models customarily would have it. If there is any lesson commonly distilled
from the experience of previous crises [Eichengreen 2001; Stiglitz 2009] is that
after a crisis ‘normalcy’ does not mean a return of the status quo ante. On the con-
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trary, the only item we know for sure that new players, new rules of the game, new
modalities of conducting business and new forms of regulation are bound to
emerge. One of the obviously foreseeable outcomes is that surviving actors will be
even bigger to fail, than the traditional ones. Efforts of the US administration, to
tackle those by way of the Volcker rules, go in the right direction, however the prob-
lem will be hard to tackle. It is not only the size, it might be other, and often hard to
delineate broader considerations, such as regional relevance, or professional signif-
icance that may prompt governments to intervene, in a chain, quite in line with the
bleak forecast of Ludwig von Mises before World War One [v. Mises 1929(1996)]. 
B., Coming to the NMS we may revive the insight, summarizing the first decade of
systemic change: institutions matter but so do policies [Havylyshyn–van Roden
2003]. Comparing the experiences of Hungary to Poland in the 2002–2010 period
speaks for itself already at the elementary level. Instituting measures of solid public
finance, avoiding adventuresome external funding for consumptive purposes, sus-
taining price stability and conducting policies generally converging to EMU criteria
allows saving the country from vulnerability and externally imposed discipline.
On the other hand, Bulgarian, Romanian and the Baltic experience seem to sug-
gest that shortcut solutions, often advocated by policymakers and businessmen as
well as the media, do not work in the longer run. Sound macro policies though do
create growth, which is good. But without creating the institutional memory in the
form of setting up institutions capable of sustaining the results of social learning
previously experienced problems may revive, and avoidable mistakes might be
repeated. The relevance of regulation, especially in the financial sector, counts by
today among the platitudes, thus is in no need of elaboration. Implementing rules of
prudent banking is certainly a must, especially if the already observable return of
malpractices is to be avoided and social explosion - or alternatively even more cost-
ly future bailouts - to be avoided. 
C., One of the truly strategic debates in and on the NMS is if they should/can return
to the previous path of export-led growth, or a more ‘balanced’ path, i.e. more
reliance on the domestic markets is the way to sustainable growth. On the base of
what we know from economic theory and history, we do not know of a single case
in the postwar period, where growth based on domestic markets could have been
sustainable, especially in small open economies. While outward orientation – a con-
cept much broader than export-led growth – does carry a cost, the experience of
the past three decades is overwhelming in terms of the efficiency of outward orien-
tation. True, more recent literature [e.g. Pitlik 2008; Baitagi et al 2009] calls atten-
tion to the relevance of institutional and policy complementarities. In short, it is not
a sectoral approach, but a broad set of coordinated policy and institution building
measures that deliver results in the long run. 
D., Finally mention should be made of the erosion of the European growth poten-
tial, which is particularly observable in the NMS [Halmai 2009]. By dodging most of
the structural reforms by most member states, the EU has maneuvered itself into a
dead alley. Structural changes that should have revived the labor markets remained
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fragmentary. The crisis also called attention to the procrastination in terms of capi-
tal market reforms and their regulation at the EU level. What was called the Lisbon
Agenda, i.e. to try to balance flexibility and competitiveness [Palánkai 2006] was to
a large degree watered down and implementation remained partial.
The erosion of European growth potential has also been exacerbated by the
insufficient attention to long term challenges, such as ageing and the research and
development potential. It is not just the amount of spending which is inadequate,
but its composition and relation to business practices, where ‘embodied technolog-
ical progress’ is being generated remained lukewarm. The explosion of public debt
in a number of core EU economies is itself a factor of slowdown owing to the
inevitable crowding out effects.
The foreseeable slowdown in the core EU implies that the external environment
of the NMS will not be particularly strongly conducive to growth. Mistaken hopes on
the EU as a major factor fostering growth, which used to figure high in the pro-EU
political discourse in the NMS is likely to produce disenchantment only. The farther
is the perspective of joining the Euro Zone, the graver is the risk of aggravating
myopia in the policy conduct of the NMS, further delaying painful but necessary
changes if the growth potential is to be revived. The drift between formal qualifica-
tions, which exploded, and actual marketable skills, social and professional alike, is
likely to develop into a major factor of social discontent, reflected in the lastingly
low levels of labor market participation in all NMS. In turn, their ability to cope with
expanding health and pension costs will remain structurally constrained - an issue
demonstrated also for a historically vibrant and much less aging US economy
[Rogoff and Bertelsman 2010]. 
While the global discourse, influenced to a large degree by environmental con-
siderations, often calls for a zero growth scenario in order to avoid the climate cata-
strophe, from the point of view of NMS zero growth is a non starter. The level of
their per capita GDP is between 40.5 per cent of the EU average (Bulgaria) and 88.2
per cent (Cyprus), that is for the majority the catching up process will take genera-
tions, even under the best of circumstances. Furthermore, as we argued above,
catching up is by no means an automatic process triggered by EU membership.
Rather the question marks behind any scenario of relatively fast and steady real con-
vergence continue to multiply, not least due to the structural and institutional weak-
nesses uncovered by the impacts of the global financial meltdown.  
WHAT TO THINK OF EU MEMBERSHIP? 
A., Accession to the EU tended to be over politicized from the very outset. As a con-
sequence, there were both inflated expectations in terms of immediate welfare
improvements, and conversely, skeptical voices aired before any of the joint
European policies could take effect. The latter is the case in terms of cohesion, in
terms of the single currency as well as in terms of environmental protection.
In a way the process of Europeanization has progressed considerably, insofar as
the paradoxes typical of old member states could be seen replicated. The median
voter does not seem to be very well informed about the complexities of the Union.
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Therefore if his concern is joblessness, he/she can blame the EU, although the
Community has next to no competences in terms of labor markets. If democratic
controls, or the judiciary for that matter, do not work perfectly in a member state,
the tendency to blame the EU is there even if it is not justified on material grounds.
For this reason the Hungarian public tends to be fairly Eurosceptic according to
recent surveys.6
However, if we take the proper historical perspective, EU accession is surely a
major success story in any area we care to mention. First and foremost, NMS ceased
to be on the borderline of competing empires, threatened by constant insecurity
and being treated as sources/triggers of insoluble interethnic conflicts. While
nobody would doubt the presence of ethnic strains, this is by no means constrained
to NMS, as the recent attacks on French police by Basque terrorists indicate. In
short, being a member of the European architecture constructed in the spirit and
practice of postwar reconciliation has ruled out many options, which were indeed
on the cards, should the EU not have played its anchor role for the NMS. Therefore
it seems simplistic to ‘try to put numbers on EU membership’ and try to assess costs
and benefits exclusively or even mainly in terms of transfer balances, or in terms of
additional trade or FDI flows. Important as these might be, they surely remain sub-
ordinate to the fundamental historic rearrangement discussed above. 
But if we take the narrower, financial perspective, the beneficial impact of the EU
is still beyond doubt, despite the well known methodological problems of assessing
the macroeconomic impacts of EU cohesion funds properly [Sirehej 2008]. First and
foremost, the ‘convergence game’ has been at play ever since 2002, i.e. when the
political decision on eastward enlargement was taken. This implied more stable
exchange rates and lower external costs of funding, for public and private invest-
ments alike. Second, from the point of view of capital investors, direct and portfolio
managers, the NMS ceased to be a part of some murky emerging market economies
and were requalified as secure European investment spots protected by a suprana-
tionally imposed Community legislation. Third, the revision of the post-2007 finan-
cial guidelines decreased the co-financing requirements to EU sponsored projects to
as low as 15 per cent, which of course allowed for more projects to be implement-
ed than under the traditional arrangements, when 50 per cent co-financing was the
rule. It is a different cup of tea if we were to ask, whether the priorities set by the
NMS, or more precisely the outcome of what many observers consider as an out-
come of ad-hoc political bargains on the spot, indeed produce those growth accel-
erating and multiplier effects, or more broadly speaking any externalities that figure
high in the official justification of cohesion spending.7
Finally in terms of institution building we might be upbeat. Whatever may the
weaknesses of EU practices be, introducing a degree of Community-wide trans-
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parency, accountability and even-handedness, including regular external checks on
the way money had been spent, are welcome additions in countries which are in the
middle of setting up new and in theory, internationally competitive institutions of
their own. Under this heading the administrative and material expenses on setting
up specialized agencies and introducing the practice of competitive bidding in a
number of areas might well be seen as a benefit rather than a sacrifice in the NMS
concerned.
B., One of the more important insights in assessing the overall impact of the Union
on the NMS is that the EU, with its policies and institutions, surely constitutes a
framework for, rather than a guarantee of, economic success. Joining the Euro
Zone, for one, does entail a number of straightforward advantages widely appreci-
ated in all strands of the literature. Meanwhile experiences of countries like
Portugal and Greece clearly indicate that being within the fences is though clearly a
plus over being left out in the cold, but is a long way from being the panacea for all
economic ills, be that low productivity or profligate public finances. 
The broader is the perspective of assessment, the more important is to under-
score this point, which might sound as a truism for the economist. For if we recall
the political atmosphere that lead to the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in
France and the Netherlands, or the one that surrounded the ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty in Ireland, Poland, Britain and the Czech Republic, the relevance of
the argument increases. Those opposing any deepening tend to underscore - often
very real - shortcomings of the existing arrangements. They express often very pro-
found doubts that improvised policy options could be indeed beneficial. And it is
common experience in old and new members, that the public opinion tends to
blame the EU for a number of issues the Community has no competences over, such
as taxation or public education.
The discourse in the NMS has switched from bad to worse in the past few years.
Initially the tendency to overrate the benefits from Union membership reached
ironic points. By now the shuttle moved to the other extreme, and the Union tends
to be blamed for most of the local illnesses, from corruption to lack of fiscal disci-
pline, from the insufficient support for small businesses to the lack of willingness of
commercial banks to lend. 
Let us be clear: an organization in charge of redistributing a mere 1 per cent of
GNI is by definition in no position to work miracles. On the other hand, if such
framework arrangements as the Stability and Growth Pact, or the European Social
Charter are made use of, these may allow for a more professional and more pragmat-
ic streamlining of local arrangements, than a free experimentation along any initia-
tive in a perfect democracy would. 
C., Finally one should rethink the position of the new member-states on issues of the
fundamental reform of the EU. Both the decision-making/organizational structure
and the major common policies [Kengyel, ed. 2010] are known to have evolved as
an outcome of ad-hoc policy bargains rather than following any theoretical maxim,
let alone constructivist design. The numbers in the Stability and Growth Pact, the
relative share of farm related spending or the entitlements in cohesion spending
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count among the best known and most widely analyzed items in the literature on
Europe. 
Thus there are two basic ways one might approach these complex issues, inten-
sively discussed at the official level in the preparation for the Financial Guidelines
for the post-2014 period. In one, traditional way we may adopt a static approach. If
we take things as given, it is in the interest of the NMS to stick to present arrange-
ments, since these contain references to and potentials for solidarity, in terms of sus-
taining substantial spending on rural areas and on physical infrastructure develop-
ment, two fields where the Communist heritage of negligence is certainly strongly
felt. By contrast, if priorizing R&D and competitiveness related spending, the edge
of the UK and the Scandinavians, which is quite significant anyway, is only to be fur-
ther increased. Under this angle the status quo is the best of all conceivable worlds.
The alternative approach calls attention to the fact that net contributors have
already found ways of attaining a de facto equalization of net contributions and ben-
efits in most areas [Richter 2008]. Furthermore by sustaining expenditure priorities
which clearly do not reflect the changed perceptions of European electorates, favor-
ing such items as environmental protection, energy security and inward migration,
will be next to impossible to legislate and sell domestically. From the economic per-
spective, narrow as it may be, it is hard to justify the public finance sense of the
expenditure items I listed in the preceding section, from funeral houses to city foun-
tains. The more serious we get about the agenda of competitiveness – or Europe
2020 – the less grandfatherish our position on sustaining spending items unrelated
to either demonstrable common gain or competitiveness we may be. Furthermore
it is already foreseeable that global trade talks and domestic pressures will translate
into a major trimming of agriculture related expenditure [Elekes–Halmai 2009]. 
Under this angle a fundamental rethinking of the way priorities are set is in
order. For one, if the EU is not, in the future, about big and often wasteful invest-
ment projects, the ‘maximization of drawable funds’ should no longer be seen as the
interest of any NMS. The more we appreciate that expenditure priorities often fol-
low a logic alien to them, such as the priority to the development of sparsely popu-
lated and arctic areas, or the focus on animal welfare, the less we shall see it as a sen-
sible and axiomatic requirement that those funds should be drawn, just because of
their availability. 
Such a reassessment of priority setting would be in line with more recent
insights of broader development economics [Szakolczai 2006] stressing the rele-
vance of institutional and generally broader social considerations at the expense of
mere quantitative expansion. Under this angle the quality of growth, just as much
the quality of life, is the real success indicator. In order to improve that, it is a
Community spending focusing on externalities and common value added, creating
a framework for sustainable development, a category much broader than growth, is
becoming the focus. And this is in line with the long term interests of the popula-
tion of the NMS as well.
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